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ABSTRACT 
The issue of how firms with inputs of variable quality will 
react in a market for transferable emissions licenses is analyzed. 
First, it is shown that the derived demand for licenses will, in 
general, be downward sloping. This is followed by a discussion of the 
effects of imperfections in product and factor markets on abatement 
decisions. 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND FOR EMISSION LICENSES* 
Robert W. Bahn 
This paper examines the qualitative effects that a market in 
transferable licenses in emissions will have on a firm's input 
decisions and its expenditure on abatement equipment. The case of the 
competitive firm is examined in detail, and this is compared with a 
firm which can exert monopoly power in product and factor markets. 
The model employed here differs from previous work in that the price 
of the variable input is explicitly related to its quality. This can 
be compared with the more conventional approach which treats the 
pollutant as a factor of production.
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Several authors have shown that 
the derived demand for inputs of fixed price and quality are downward 
sloping.
2 
In Section 1, this result is extended to the case where 
input quality can be varied. Section 2 compares the demand for 
licenses under competition with the demand for licenses when a firm 
can exert power over product or factor markets. In Section 3, the 
role of other traders and the authority issuing licenses is explicitly 
included in the analysis. Section 4 summarizes the results. 
1. The General Problem 
Attention is focused on the problem of controlling emissions 
associated with the use of productive inputs. When the relationship 
between emissions and ambient pollutant concentrations is linear, then 
the subsequent analysis obtains for the control of secondary 
pollutants as well as the control of primary emissions. 
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The control of sulfur oxides emissions is one example for 
which the model would be appropriate. Sulfur enters into the 
production process through the use of natural resources that contain 
it, usually coal and petroleum used as energy inputs. When these 
inputs are burned some of the sulfur contained in them is converted to 
S02 and S03. For a given abatement technology, the relationship 
between sulfur entering the production process and resulting emissions 
of sulfur oxides is approximately linear. 
The firm may adopt two basic approaches to reducing emissions. 
It can either reduce emissions directly by purchasing equipment such 
as scrubbers and baghouses or it can reduce the level of pollutant 
entering into the production process. This latter reduction is 
normally accomplished by purchasing higher quality inputs, which 
typically cost more, by curtailing output, or by varying the amount of 
inputs used per unit of output in production. For simplicity, the 
last method for reducing emissions will be ignored. Suppose that the 
firm has a production function f(E), where E represents the level of 
inputs. The function f is assumed to be twice differentiable and 
strictly concave so that f' ) 0 and f' ' < 0. 
Let X(R,s,E) characterize the firm's abatement opportunities. 
X is the total annual emission rate; R is the total annual expenditure 
on abatement; and s is the amount of the pollutant contained in a unit 
of the input stream, E. Emissions are assumed to decrease with1 
greater abatement expenditures, but there are decreasing returns to 
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such endeavors, (i. e., x1 < 0 and x11 > 0). On the other hand, annual 
emissions will increase if the firm chooses lower quality inputs or 
increases the level of its inputs (i.e. , X2 > 0 and X3 > 0). 
Furthermore, it will be assumed that increasing inputs will not 
improve the marginal effect of a given pollutant content, and may make 
it worse (i. e. , x23 l 0).
3 The firm's problem is to maximize profits, 
or the difference between total revenues and the sum of input costs, 
abatement costs and license costs. Formally, we have: 
where 
p 
Maximize pf(E) - e(s)E - wX(R,s,E) - R 
R, s,E 
price of output, 
e(s) = unit price of inputs; e' < 0 e' ' > 0, and 
w = license price. 
(1) 
The price of inputs is presumed to be a convex function of the 
pollutant content. From this, it immediately follows that a firm 
would never wish to use two or more different quality inputs 
simultaneously, where such inputs are defined solely in terms of 
pollutant content. 4 Empirically, this relationship has been shown to 
hold approximately for heavy fuel oil prices in Los Angeles.
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First-order conditions for an interior solution are given by: 
- wx1 - 1 = o (2) 
- e'E - wX2 = 0 (3)
 
4 
pf' - e - wX3 0 (4) 
Equation (2J says that at the margin, an additional dollar spent on 
abatement equipment will be exactly offset by the savings resulting 
from decreased emissions. Equation (3) balances the reduction in 
emissions from buying higher quality inputs against the increase in 
the cost of buying licenses. Equation (4) equates the marginal 
revenue product of using an additional unit of inputs with the 
increase in the cost of input, which consists of two components: the 
direct cost of inputs, e, and the indirect cost due to having to 
purchase more licenses, wX3. 
The interesting comparative statics questions revolve around 
the effect of a change in the license price on abatement expenditures, 
the pollutant content of inputs, the level of inputs, and hence, the 
ultimate level of emissions which is chosen. Totally differentiating 
the first order conditions gives rise to the following Hessian 
matrix, C: 
-wxll -wX12 
-wX13 
c =I -wx12 (-e"E-wx22) (-e' -wx23) 
-wX13 
(-e' -wx23) (pf" -wx33) 
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Let C .. denote the ijth cofactor of C and [CJ denote the determinant. 1J 
Performing the comparative statics yields expressions for the effect 
of a change in license price on the endogenous variables: 
aR 1 
aw = CCl[CllXl + C12X2 + C13X3] 
as 1 
aw = (C]CC12Xl + C22X2 + C23X3] 
aE 1 
aw = £Cf[C13Xl + C23X2 + C33X3] 
ax 
= x aR + x h + x aE aw 1 aw 2 aw 3 aw 
(SJ 
(6J 
(7) 
(8 ) 
Assume that sufficiency conditions for an interior maximum are met.6 
This implies that C is negative definite. Even with this assumption, 
:!. :: and :! cannot be signed unambiguously. However, it is possible 
to show that the demand for licenses is downward sloping (i. e. , 
:! < 0) . Substituting equations (S) - (7) into (8 ) yields: 
(Xl ,X2 ,X3) I cu c21 c311 I x1 
ax =-ml I c12 aw en c32 x2 
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cu c23 c33 x3 
(9J 
Because C is negative definite, this implies C-l is negative definite. 
Thus, equation (9J indicates that :! < 0. 
While the sign of the terms in equations (SJ - (7) cannot be 
determined exactly, it is possible to infer from equation (9) that an 
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increase in the price of a license will induce at least one of the 
following events: (1) an increase in the level of annual abatement 
expenditures, (2) a decrease in the pollutant content of inputs or (3) 
a decrease in the level of inputs. Of course, it is possible that 
more than one of these events will occur in response to a license 
price increase, but at least one such event must occur. 
The result derived here concerning the downward sloping demand 
curves also holds for the case in which the level of inputs are fixed, 
but the quality is allowed to vary. This latter case may be 
applicable to several firms in the short run. A case in point would 
be electric utilities who burn high sulfur residual fuel oils. The 
only difference between the case when inputs are constrained and the 
more general case is that in the constrained case, an increase in the 
license price will lead to an increase in abatement expenditures or a 
decrease in the pollutant content of inputs, and possibly both. 
It is a straightforward matter to show a monopolist will have 
a downward sloping derived demand for licenses in this general case. 
However, at this level of analysis, it is not obvious how the demand 
by a competitive firm compares with the demand by a firm that can 
exert market power. To allow for a case by case comparison, it is 
helpful to consider a less general formulation. This is the subject 
of the next section. 
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2. ! Comparison of Competition� Market Power 
A simple case to analyze is where the pollntant in the inputs 
just equals emissions; that ia, no abatement can be achieved through 
expenditure on equipment. In this case, reductions can be achieved by 
reducing the pollutant content of inputs and/or reducing the level of 
inputs. One example would be the containment of sulfur oxides through 
the purchase of lower sulfur fuels. Formally, the firm's problem may 
be written as follows: 
Maximize pf(E) - e(s) E - wsE 
a,E 
First-order conditions for an interior maximum are given by: 
-e' E - wE = 0 
pf' - e - ws = 0. 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
Equation (11) indicates that s should be chosen so as to equate the 
cost of polluting more, w, with the marginal cost of buying higher 
quality inputs, -e'(s) . Equation (12) balances the marginal revenue 
product with an increase in input costs. 
Define B to be the Hessian associated with (10). Then, 
B 
[-•:(•)E 
.: .. ]
(13) 
From the assumptions on e and f, B is negative definite. An 
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e%amination of the effects of a change in the price of a license on 
pollutant content and the overall level of inputs yields: 
ll 
aw 
aE 
aw 
_ 
1 < O 
___ 
s_ -
pf" < 0 
Equation (14) says that the pollutant content decreases with an 
(14) 
(IS) 
increase in the price of a license while (1 5) says that the level of 
inputs also declines. Since the overall level of emissions is given 
by sE, it is readily seen that emissions decrease in response to an 
increase in the price of a license. 
It is possible to compare the situation when the firm can 
e%ert market power with the competitive case by making suitable 
changes in (10) and carrying out the required optimization. Three 
cases will be considered: first, the case of pure monopoly; ne%t, the 
case when a firm e%erts some influence over the energy market and 
finally, the case when a firm can dominate the license market. The 
monopolist's problem is the same as above, e%cept now p = p(f(E) ) ,  
which gives: 
Ma%imize p(f(E}) f(E) - e(s) E - wsE 
s,E 
First- order conditions for an interior ma%imum are given by: 
-e'(s) E - wE 0 
pf' + fp'f' - e(s) WS 0 
(1 6) 
(17) 
(18) 
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Equations (1 7) is identical with equation (11). From the assumptions 
on e, the value for s which solves (17) (assum ing one e%ists) will be 
unique.
7 
Thus, the monopolist and perfect competitor will choose the 
same pollutant content. To determine who would pollute more, it is 
only necessary to consider whether the monopolist will use more or 
fewer inputs than in the competitive case. Assum ing the revenue 
function for the monopolist is strictly convave and an interior 
solution to the problem e%ists, then the monopolist will use less 
energy and, hence, pollute less than his competitive counterpart. To 
see this, define the revenue function: R(E) = p(f(E) ) f(E) . The usual 
differentiability assumptions imply R' ) 0 and R'' < 0. Comparin� 
conditions (12) and (18), it is clear that setting E at the optimal 
level in the competitive case will yield the following inequality: 
pf' + fp'f' < e(s) + ws, (19) 
since fp'f' < 0. The question is whether (19) can be brought into 
equality by adjusting E. From (11) and (17), -we saw that the 
pollutant content is identical for the two cases, independent of the 
level of inputs which is chosen. This means that the e%pression on 
the right- hand size of (19) can be treated as a constant. Noting that 
the left-hand side of (19) equals R'(E) , it immediately follows that 
the only way to bring (19) back into equality is to decrease E from 
the competitive level. 
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So far, we have derived conditions under which the monopolist 
will emit less and produce less than in the perfectly competitive 
case. The key assumption concerned the shape of the revenue function. 
This assumption is also critical for deriving the comparative statics 
results given below: 
ll 
aw 
aE 
aw 
-
__ 
1� 
e"(s) < 0 
_
_ s_ 
R"(E) < 0 
(20) 
(21) 
A comparison of Equations (14) and (20) reveals that the effect of a 
change in license price on pollutant content will be the same for the 
monopolist and the competitive firm for a given level of input 
quality. The effect of a change in license price on input usage will, 
in general, differ, even for inputs of the same quality. However, the 
analysis reveals that the qualitative results under monopoly and 
competition are the same. Both pollutant content and input usage 
decline with an increase in the price of a license. 
The results for the case in which the firm faces an upward 
sloping supply curve for inputs closely parallel the monopoly case. 
The problem is the same as the competitive case except e is now a 
function of s and E. The firm tries to: 
Maximize pf(E) - e(s,E)E - wsE. 
s, E 
The price of inputs is assumed to increase as demand increases 
(22) 
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(e2) 0). In addition, it will be assumed that changing the pollutant 
content will have no influence on the relationship between input 
demand and price (e12 = 0). This latter assumption essentially allows 
the solution to the first-order conditions to proceed in two stages. 
First, the pollutant content is determined, and then the level of 
inputs is chosen. 
First order conditions for an interior maximum to (22) are 
given by: 
e1E - wE = 0 (23) 
pf' e - Ee2 - ws 0 (24) 
Equation (23) determines the optimal pollutant content, s. If E is 
set to the optimal competitive level, this gives rise to the following 
inequality: 
pf' - Ee2 < e + ws (25) 
The problem is to adjust E so as to bring (24) into equality so that 
the first order conditions are satisfied. Assuming that the costs of 
inputs eE, is a convex function in E (for any given s) is sufficient 
to insure that the optimal level of inputs will be less than the 
competitive case. 
The problem of assessing the behavior of a firm which can 
exert control over the market price for emissions licenses is similar 
to the previous case, but somewhat more complex. The general problem 
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is the same as in the competitive case except now license price is 
presumed to be negatively related to emissions so that w=w(sE) and 
w' ) O. The conventional approach to such problems is to disregard 
output effects and solve the following cost minimization. 
Minimize C(s) 
s 
e(s)E + w(sE)sE, (26) 
where the level of inputs is fixed at E. There are two basic reasons 
for ignoring output effects: first, because the comparative statics 
results are ambiguous when these effects are included, and secondly, 
because output effects may not be very important in the short-run. 
Dividing (26) by E and solving the equivalent minimization 
problem yielda the following first order condition: 
e'(s) + w + sEw' 0 (27) 
Equation (27) balances the marginal cost of buying more licenses, 
w + sEw', with the cost of buying lower sulfur fuel. If the cost 
function, C(1), is convex so that C''(1) l 0, then the optimal 
pollutant content chosen will be less than in the competitive case, 
provided the output produced is the same. The argument parallels the 
case of monopoly and will not be repeated here. Instead, we turn to 
an alternative formulation of the market power problem which 
explicitly considers the role of other agents. 
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3. Market Power: ! More General Approach 
The subsequent analysis considers the case where one agent 
exercises market power, while all other agents assume they cannot 
affect the price of a license or the quantity of licenses issued, L, 
(i.e., a Stackelberg ''leader and follower'' model). The aggregate 
reported demand curve for all agents excluding i is denoted by Q
-i(w); 
it is assumed that Q
-i is twice continuously differentiable and 
downward sloping, i.e., Q
-i' < O. Let Q(w) represent the aggregation 
of i's true demand for licenses, Q.(w), with Q
-i(w), which i takes as 
1 
given. The quantity of licenses supplied by the ''center'' is given 
by C(w) which is presumed to be twice continuously differentiable and 
strictly increasing, i.e., C' ) O. The curves are illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Agent i is aware that be may choose any point on the center'• 
supply curve above the price of w0, which represents the equilibrium 
.price if i submits no demand. A price of w1, assumed to be greater 
than w0, would result if i submitted his true demand. 
To derive i's best approach to the problem, first note that 
bis effective supply, denoted as S(w) is given by: 
-i S(w) = C(w) - Q (w) for w l w0 
-i' Because C' ) 0 and Q < 0, S'(w) > 0, which means that aaent i's 
effective supply curve of licenses to i is strictly increasing. 
(28 ) 
w 
'W 
LICENSE -w1
PRICE 2 
14 15 
l 
LICENSE QUANTITY
FIGURE 1 
The General Supply and Demand Problem 
Define the inverse of S(w) as s(L). Since S is npward sloping, so is 
its inverse, i.e. , 
w s (L) s, > 0 (29) 
Finally, define agent i's inverse demand function as di(L); this 
fnnction is presumed to be strictly decreasing, i. e. , di' < O. Agent 
i's problem is depicted in Figure 2. L1 represents the quantity of 
licenses agent i receives if he reveals his true demand and the market 
clears at w1. 
The question which i must address is whether it is in his 
interest to misstate his true demand, and if so, in which direction. 
To answer this question i's interest is defined as follows: 
Agent i's net gain ,.Ld.(q)dq - s(L)L 
Jo i 
(30) 
Equation (30) says that the gain i derives by purchasing L licenses is 
given by the difference between the area under his inverse demand 
curve between 0 and L and the costs of purchasing L licenses. With 
this measure of welfare, it is apparent that agent i will never demand 
more than L1 licenses since he not only has to pay more for all 
inframarginal units, but he also loses on the marginal units as well. 
The only other possibility is that agent i demands fewer than L1 
licenses. Suppose that he chooses a level of licenses equal to L2 as 
illustrated in Figure 2. To compare this outcome to the situation in 
which i recieves L1 licenses, it is convenient to sort out his gains 
LICENSE
PRICE
'W 
w, 
w2 
'Wo 
16 17 
L2 L1 L 
LICENSE QUANTITY
FIGURE 2 
Agent i's Problem 
and losses in a systematic manner. The gains to i which resnlt from 
being charged a price w2 instead of w1 are noted by the shaded area B. 
Bis losses due to the fact he purchases CL1 - L2) fewer licenses are 
represented by area A. If (B - A) is positive, then we may conclude 
that i's welfare associated with CL2,w2) exceeds that associated with 
revealing his truthful demand, CL1,w1). The problem of showing that 
it is always in i's interest to overabate is equivalent to showing 
that there exists an Le(O ,L1J f�r which CB - A) is positive. 
Maximizing (30) with respect to L and assuming an interior 
maximum exists yields the following first order condition: 
di(L)(s(L) + Ls'(L)) 0 (3
1) 
Noting s'(L) > 0 implies: 
di ( L1 ) < s ( L1 ) + L1 s ' ( L1) (32) 
To bring (32) back into equality requires that the L selected be less 
than L1• This shows that it is in agent i's interest to 
underrepresent his demand for pollution emission provided that there 
is no subsequent trading of licenses, agent i knows the demand curve 
of all other agents and the supply curve of the center, and the second 
order conditions are satisfied. It is of some importance to know what 
conditions on the demand or supply curve would guarantee that the 
stationary point is a local maximum. The second order sufficiency 
conditions require: 
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. 
d.(L) - 2s'(L) - Ls"(L) < 0 
1 
(33) 
From (33), we see that it is sufficient to presume that the rate of 
change of the slope of the effective supply curve, s''(L), is 
nonnegative.8 
The problem analyzed above parallels the case of pure 
monoposony very closely. The only difference is that agent i is not 
the only buyer, and hence, must consider bow the demand of others will 
affect his supply. The qualitative results which emerge in the two 
problems are the same, namely that output and price are both below the 
level they would have reached in the presence of competition. 
The extreme cases were not considered in the analysis. If 
agent i's effective supply curve does not vary with price, then he 
will demand L1 licenses since, by assumption, he cannot exert any 
downward pressure on the price of a license. In this case i would 
perceive the license market in the same light as an emissions tax. 
Another case not considered is when the center fixes the supply of 
licenses so that C'(w) = 0. In this case, the result still obtains 
that the firms with market power will overabate. 
The principal result is called into question, however, when 
any ''real world'' considerations are brought to bear on the problem. 
For example, an incomplete knowledge of others' demand curves and the 
center's supply curve would mean that agent i would have to gues's at 
the equilibrium price in his absence. Of course, knowing the 
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equilibrium price is not enough. Agent i cannot construct his 
effective supply curve without knowing the center's supply and others' 
demands over a fairly wide range. The addition of secondary markets 
further complicates the issue. The clearing price expected in the 
secondary markets is likely to vary across agents and will affect each 
individual's behavior in the initial auction. Without explicit 
modeling of such problems, it is a little premature to conclude that 
market power will result in overabatement. 
4. Conclusions 
The analysis focused on the derived demand for tradable 
licenses. In the general case it was found that introducing inputs of 
different quality did not change the basic result that the derived 
demand was downward sloping. This holds both for the monopolist and 
the competitive firm. A comparison of three cases of market power in 
a more restricted setting revealed that in all three cases, firms 
would tend to overabate in comparison to the competitive firm. A more 
general analysis of the case when a firm can dominate the license 
market indicated that the assumptions required to obtain the 
overabatement result may be too restrictive. This is one area which 
merits further thought if marketable permits are to become a reality. 
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Footnotes 
*The wort reported here was snpported in part by the California 
Air Resources B oard. I wish to thank Roger Noll and James Quirt 
for providing helpful comments. All views and conclusions expressed 
herein are my responsibility. 
1. For example, see B aum ol and Oates (197Sl, p. 3Sff. 
2. For examples, see Samuelson (1974), pp. 76-78, Russell (1964) and 
Winch (196S). 
3. This assumption can be explained in terms of the desulfurization 
of fuel oil. Suppose the effect of desulfurization is to remove a 
constant fraction (1 - !) of total potential emissions, sE. Total n 
expenditure on abatement is constant by assumption. The bl . pro em 1s to 
consider how :! changes as inputs increase. Consider a discrete change 
in inputs from E to (E + AE). AX B efore the change, As 
AX 1 the change As = ;As(E + AE). In 
the limit, it is apparent that 12320. 
!AsE. After n 
4. The proof is straightforward. Suppose the firm wishes to use two 
different inputs with respective costs e(s1) and e(s2). Let A equal 
the fraction apent on the first tYIJe and (1-A) be the fraction spent 
on the second. Then, the average cost of inputs would be 
[Ae(s1l + (1-A )e( s2JJ > e (As + (l-A )s2) . Thus, using inputs of the 
same quality with the equivalent pollutant content would be cheaper. 
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If the firm wishes to purchase n different quality inputs, where n i1 
arbitrary, the same line of reasoning holds. 
The proof assumes, of course, that any convex combination of 
pollutant contents are available for values of A on the unit interval. 
In the case of sulfur in fuel oil, this i1 a reasonable approximation. 
S. On this point, see Chapter 3 of ' ' Implementing Tradable Emission 
Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air Shed,'' written by 
William Rogerson. 
6. For the problem to mate sense, R, 1, and E must be nonnegative. 
These constraints are assumed to be ineffective. 
7. For example, if lim e' (sl = +m and lim e'(s) = 0 (i.e., e is a 
s� ,_ ... 
''neoclassical'' function), then for any w > 0, (17) has a unique 
positive solution in s. 
8. In tho economics literature the abatement cost function for 111 
firms i1 tYIJically presumed to be twice differentiable and strictly 
convex. Accepting this assumption would mean that a sufficient 
condition for a global maximum on (O,L1l would be that C' ' (w) 10. For 
a specific example, 1ee Ackerman, p. 279. 
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